

throughout the country the more intrusive type of inspections required by the Additional Protocol of the IAEA, supply the IAEA with full documentation about suspected past violations, and freeze the construction of more centrifuges and heavy-water reactors that could produce plutonium.

History, particularly that of U.S.–North Korean relations, suggests that such agreements are just the start of serious negotiations. Even if a deal is struck, delays and backsliding should be expected. To limit their impact and keep them from leading to the agreement's dissolution, it would be necessary for Washington to both keep its promises and maintain credible threats that it would impose sanctions or even use limited force against Iran if Tehran violated its commitments.

Most important, however, would be a reduction in the security threat that the United States poses to Iran. Given the need for Washington to have a credible deterrent against, say, terrorist attacks sponsored by Iran, it would be ill advised to offer Tehran a blanket security guarantee. But

more limited guarantees, such as a commitment not to use nuclear weapons and other commitments of the type offered North Korea under the Agreed Framework, could be effective. They would reassure Tehran and pave the way toward the eventual normalization of U.S.–Iran relations while signaling to other states that nuclear weapons are not the be all and end all of security. None of this will happen, however, if officials keep threatening to topple the Iranian government. In any final settlement, Tehran need to agree to freeze its nuclear program, end its support for terrorism, and Washington along with China, Russia, and the EU-3—must issue a joint security guarantee that respects Iran's political sovereignty, thus committing the United States to promote democracy only by peaceful means. Peaceful coexistence does not mean friendly relations, but it does mean exercising mutual restraint. Relinquishing the threat of regime change by force is a necessary and acceptable price for the United States to pay to prevent Tehran from getting the bomb.

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### FROM FINAL SOLUTIONS: MASS KILLING AND GENOCIDE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

#### Introduction: Mass Killing in Historical and Theoretical Perspective

\*\*\* Episodes of mass killing in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda are but the latest entries on a long list of atrocities extending back to earliest

From *Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). Some of the author's notes have been omitted.

recorded history, even into the archeological record.<sup>1</sup> Mass killings have been perpetrated against a wide range of nations, cultures, forms of government, and ethnic and religious groups. Between 60 million and 150 million people probably have perished in episodes of mass killings during the twentieth century alone. In comparison, international and civil wars have counted for approximately 34 million deaths during the same period.<sup>3\*\*\*</sup>

Many of the most widely accepted explanations of genocide and mass killing see the

of these events in the social structures, forms of government, or collective psychology of the societies in which they take place. In particular, many scholars have focused on the dangers of dehumanizing attitudes and deep cleavages between social groups, on the psychological and political consequences of major societal crises such as wars or revolutions, and on the concentration of unchecked power in undemocratic political systems.

Although these theories have generated many important insights, each of them also has significant problems or limitations. Structural factors such as severe ethnic, racial, national, or religious divisions between social groups fail to provide a reliable indicator of mass killing. Indeed, some of the bloodiest mass killings in history have occurred in relatively homogeneous societies, between groups of the same or closely related ethnicity, nationality, religion, or class. Conversely, many deeply divided societies have endured for extended periods without experiencing mass killing.

Nor can mass killing adequately be explained by the presence of highly undemocratic governments or the occurrence of major social crises. While there is substantial evidence that these factors increase the risk that mass killing will occur, the great majority of undemocratic governments and social crises are not associated with massive violence against civilians, suggesting that other important causes are at work.

I believe that an understanding of mass killing must begin with the specific goals and strategies of high political and military leaders, not with broad social or political factors. Previous theoretical studies of genocide have tended to diminish the role of leadership on the grounds that the interests and ideas of a few elites cannot account for the participation of the rest of society in the violence. My research, however, suggests that society at large plays a smaller role in mass killing than is commonly assumed. Mass killing is rarely a popular enterprise in which neighbor turns against neighbor. On the contrary, the impetus for mass killing usually originates from a relatively

small group of powerful political or military leaders. Sometimes even individual leaders can play a decisive role in instigating and determining the course of the slaughter. Scholars have long struggled, for example, to imagine the Great Terror without Stalin, the Holocaust without Hitler, or the Cultural Revolution without Mao.

It is true that these tyrants could not have accomplished their crimes without help from others in their societies. Nevertheless, a broad examination of the phenomenon of mass killing in the twentieth century reveals that the minimum level of social support necessary to carry out mass killing has been uncomfortably easy to achieve. Leaders have powerful methods to recruit the individuals needed to carry out mass killing and to secure the compliance or at least the passivity of the rest of society. The broader public sometimes approves of mass killing, but often it does not. Whatever the sympathies of the public, the active support of a large portion of society is usually not required to carry out mass killing. The violence itself is typically performed by a relatively small group of people, usually members of military or paramilitary organizations. They carry out their bloody work often with little more than the passive acceptance of the rest of society, including members of the perpetrators' own social groups.

In light of these unsettling findings, I argue that the causes of mass killing will be best understood when the phenomenon is studied from what I call a strategic perspective. The strategic perspective suggests that mass killing is most accurately viewed as an instrumental policy—a brutal strategy designed to accomplish leaders' most important ideological or political objectives and counter what they see as their most dangerous threats.

Like war, mass killing can be a powerful political and military tool. Unfortunately, leaders throughout history have proved all too ready to use this tool when it seemed to serve their purposes. Many scholars have sought to draw a clear line between warfare and mass killing, but I believe that the two phenomena are closely related.

This is not merely because mass killing so often occurs during times of war. Rather, it is because both phenomena involve the use of organized violence to compel others to do what they would not otherwise do. Contrary to common perceptions, perpetrators seldom view mass killing as an end in itself. Violence against victim groups is rarely intended to physically exterminate entire populations as such. More often, its purpose is to force victims to submit to radically new ways of life, to give up their homes and possessions, or to cease their support for political or military opposition groups. Some perpetrators, most notably the Nazis, have attempted to totally exterminate victim populations. Policies of extermination, however, usually emerge only after leaders have concluded that other options for achieving their ends, including less violent forms of repression or even limited concessions to victim groups, are ineffective or impractical.

The most meaningful distinction between war and mass killing, therefore, is not the purpose of its violence but the nature of its victims. War merges with mass killing when its intended targets become unarmed civilians rather than soldiers.

Thus, perpetrators see mass killing as a "final solution" in two respects. Mass killing is a final solution because it is permanent. It obviates the need for future efforts to resolve the perceived problems posed by its victims. Mass killing is also final, however, because it is usually the last in a series of efforts to "solve" these problems using other means. It usually emerges out of leaders' frustration with conventional military and political strategies for dealing with their victims. Perhaps perpetrators hesitate to resort immediately to this level of violence because some shred of humanity or compassion compels them to consider alternatives. More likely, perpetrators first seek less violent solutions because strategies of mass killing can carry substantial risks—inciting violent resistance from victim groups, alienating domestic populations and foreign powers, or provoking intervention by third parties. When perpetrators perceive the stakes to be high enough, and when less violent alternatives

appear to be blocked or unworkable, however, the incentives to consider mass killing multiply.

As with war, even the most despotic leaders do not see mass killing as the most appropriate solution to every problem. Many scholars have noted that perpetrators may view genocide or mass killing as a "rational" response to a perceived threat, but few have attempted to explain why perpetrators see this kind of violence as an appropriate response to some threats but not others. I contend that leaders are likely to perceive mass killing as an attractive means to achieve their ends only in very specific circumstances. My research identifies several real-world scenarios that seem to generate powerful incentives for leaders to consider mass killing. Three of these scenarios, which account for the greatest number of episodes of mass killing in the twentieth century as well as the greatest number of victims, serve as the major focus of this book.

First, mass killing can be an attractive strategy for regimes seeking to achieve the radical communization of their societies. Indeed, communist regimes probably have been responsible for the most violent mass killings in human history. Radical communist regimes have been so closely associated with mass killing because the changes they have sought to bring about in their societies have resulted in the nearly complete material dispossession of vast populations. Communist policies such as agricultural collectivization have stripped tens of millions of people of their homes and property and have obliterated traditional ways of life. In practice, few people have been willing to submit to such severe changes in the absence of violence and coercion. \* \* \*

Second, regimes seeking to implement policies of large-scale ethnic cleansing also face significant incentives to consider mass killing. The mass killing of ethnic, national, or religious groups has often been portrayed as the result of deep-seated hatred of victims by perpetrators, or sometimes simply as killing for killing's sake. I argue, however, that ethnic mass killing occurs when leaders believe that their victims pose a threat that can be countered only by removing them from society or

by permanently destroying their ability to organize politically or militarily. This perception may be based on perpetrators' racist or nationalistic ideological beliefs, or it may be a reaction to real, although almost always exaggerated, threatening actions of victim groups. Ethnic cleansing and mass killing are not one and the same, but they have often gone hand in hand. Forcing people to abandon their homes, belongings, and history for an unknown life in distant lands often requires considerable coercion. Even after victims have been coerced into flight, the process and aftermath of large population movements can be deadly. The bloodiest episodes of ethnic mass killing, however, occur when perpetrators conclude that physically expelling victims from society is impossible or impractical. Perpetrators may reach this conclusion when there simply are no territories available to receive large numbers of victims, or because they fear that victims will continue to pose a threat from across the border. Whatever the reasons, once perpetrators reject the possibility of expulsion as an effective of dealing with victim groups, the impulse for ethnic cleansing can escalate to systematic extermination.

Third, regimes seeking to defeat major guerrilla insurgencies may be drawn to strategies of mass killing. My research suggests that the intentional slaughter of civilians in the effort to defeat guerrilla insurgencies was the most common impetus for mass killing in the twentieth century. Guerrilla warfare has so often led to mass killing because the use of guerrilla tactics by insurgent groups generates powerful incentives for counterinsurgency forces to target civilians. Much more than conventional armies, guerrilla forces must rely directly on the civilian population for food, shelter, and information. Although the support of the civilian population is one of the primary strengths of guerrilla warfare, it can also be a weakness. Unlike guerrilla forces themselves, the civilian populations upon which insurgents rely are largely defenseless, immobile, and impossible to conceal. Military organizations seeking to defeat guerrillas therefore often find it easier to target their base of

support in the people than to engage the guerrillas themselves. This effort to isolate the guerrillas from their civilian support has often resulted in mass killing.

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## 1. Mass Killing and Genocide

No generally accepted terminology exists to describe the intentional killing of large numbers of noncombatants. The most likely contender, of course, is the term "genocide." This term, however, fails to capture the broad range of events I wish to examine. The most important limitation of "genocide" is its relatively narrow meaning, both in its etymology and in the formal United Nations definition of groups that qualify as its victims.

Raphael Lemkin, a Polish jurist of Jewish descent, first coined the word "genocide" in 1944. To create the term, Lemkin combined the Greek word *genos*, meaning "race or tribe," with the Latin derivative *cide*, which means "to kill." Lemkin defined genocide as "a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves."<sup>4</sup> The United Nations Genocide Convention of 1948, which Lemkin played a major role in drafting, limits the victims of genocide to "national, ethnical, racial or religious" groups.<sup>5</sup> Similarly, the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines genocide as "the deliberate and systematic extermination of an ethnic or national group."<sup>6</sup>

Many of the most infamous and important "genocidal" events of this century, however, including the deliberate killing of between 10 million and 23 million people in the Soviet Union, between 10 million and 46 million in China, and between 1 million and 2 million in Cambodia, have not primarily involved clashes between different ethnic or national groups. In many other episodes of large-scale, systematic killing, ethnic, national or religious groups have been targeted, but not because of their group identity per se.

Because "genocide" is a term of general interest to society, however, and because it carries with it the weight of powerful moral sanction, many authors have been reluctant to give it up. Indeed, so politically powerful is the term that activists have applied it to policies such as abortion, interracial adoption, and lack of government funding for AIDS treatment and research.<sup>7</sup> As a result, the precise definition of the term has become the subject of intense debate among genocide scholars, policy makers, and human rights advocates.<sup>8</sup> Ever since the Genocide Convention was drafted, many authors have dissented from the UN definition, taking issue with, among other things, its apparent exclusion of political and other non-ethnic groups from the definition of genocide.

I strongly believe that understanding the causes of the systematic murder of noncombatants is important, regardless of the group identity of the victims. In academic works, however, it is useful if central terms coincide with their common English usage and etymology so that they can be readily understood, even by readers from outside the field. From a political perspective, it may be more effective to include non-ethnic groups in the definition of genocide and in the international agreements designed to prevent this kind of violence. From a scholarly perspective, however, clarity is paramount.

### What Is Mass Killing?

In order to avoid this and other difficulties with the term "genocide," I utilize the term "mass killing"—defined here simply as *the intentional killing of a massive number of noncombatants*.<sup>9</sup> Victims of mass killing may be members of any kind of group (ethnic, political, religious, etc.) as long as they are noncombatants and as long as their deaths were caused intentionally. Three aspects of the definition of mass killing warrant further elaboration.

First, the mass killing must be intentional, which distinguishes it from deaths caused by natural disasters, outbreaks of disease, or the un-

intentional killing of civilians during war.<sup>10</sup> This definition is not limited to "direct" methods of killing such as execution, gassing, and bombing. It includes deaths caused by starvation, exposure, or disease resulting from the intentional confiscation, destruction, or blockade of the necessities of life. It also includes deaths caused by starvation, exhaustion, exposure, or disease during forced relocation or forced labor.

Determining the intentionality of deaths due to these causes can be extremely difficult, since it requires knowledge of the specific aims of the perpetrators. For the purposes of this definition, deaths need not be the result of policies designed specifically to kill in order to be considered mass killing. I also consider deaths to be intentional if they result from policies designed to compel or coerce civilian populations to change their behavior—and if the perpetrators could have reasonably expected that these policies would result in widespread death. Thus, civilians killed by aerial bombardment would be considered victims of mass killing only if their attackers intentionally aimed to kill or terrorize civilians as part of an effort to coerce survivors to surrender. If the civilians were killed as the attackers attempted to destroy nearby military forces or infrastructure, however, these deaths would be considered unintentional even though the attacker might have expected a certain level of civilian casualties. Deaths resulting from forced marches, forced labor, or forced deportation are considered intentional if perpetrators could have reasonably expected that implementing these policies would lead to large numbers of civilian deaths—even if perpetrators did not set out to kill these victims, per se. Unlike the civilian deaths caused by the bombing of factories or nearby military installations, civilian populations are the direct objects of forced marches, forced labour and deportation, not the coincidental victims of policies targeted against soldiers or physical structures.

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The second aspect of the definition of mass killing that requires further specification is the meaning

of "a massive number." Unlike most scholarly definitions of genocide, mass killing does not specify that perpetrators must possess the intent to destroy an entire group or even a specific percentage of it.<sup>11</sup> Rather, for the purposes of this definition, a massive number is defined simply as at least fifty thousand intentional deaths over the course of five or fewer years.<sup>12</sup> \* \* \*

The third aspect of the definition of mass killing that warrants clarification is the term "noncombatant." This definition focuses on the killing of noncombatants because it is violence directed against noncombatants that distinguishes mass killing from other forms of warfare and that most offends our moral sensibilities. A noncombatant is defined as any unarmed person who is not a member of an organized military group and who does not actively participate in hostilities by intending to cause physical harm to enemy personnel or property.<sup>13</sup> It should be noted that simply associating with combatants, providing food or other nonlethal military supplies to them, or participating in nonviolent political activities in support of armed forces does not convert a noncombatant to a combatant. Because these activities pose no immediate threat of physical harm to combatants, individuals who engage in them deserve protection from killing—although they may be subject to judicial punishments. \* \* \*

### 3. The Strategic Logic of Mass Killing

To identify societies at high risk for mass killing, I have suggested, we must first understand the specific goals, ideas, and beliefs of powerful groups and leaders, not necessarily the broad social structures or systems of government of the societies over which these leaders preside. \* \* \*

\* \* \* I contend that mass killing occurs when powerful groups come to believe it is the best available means to accomplish certain radical goals, counter specific types of threats, or solve difficult military problems. From this perspective, mass killing should be viewed as an instrumental policy calculated to achieve important political and military objectives with respect to other groups—a "final solution" to its perpetrators' most urgent problems.

Because mass killing is a means to an end, it is rarely a policy of first resort. Perpetrators commonly experiment with other, less violent or even conciliatory means in the attempt to achieve their ends. When these means fail or are deemed too costly or demanding, however, leaders are forced to choose between compromising their most important goals and interests or resorting to more violent methods to achieve them. Regardless of perpetrators' original intentions or attitudes toward their victims, the failure or frustration of other means can make mass killing a more attractive option.

It is important to emphasize that a strategic understanding of mass killing does not imply that perpetrators always evaluate objectively the problems they face in their environment, nor that they accurately assess the ability of mass killing to resolve these problems. Human beings act on the basis of their subjective perceptions and beliefs, not objective reality. Indeed, the powerful role that small groups and individuals play in the conception and implementation of policies of mass killing can amplify the influence of misperceptions in promoting such violence. The often misguided and sometimes outrightly bizarre ideas and beliefs of perpetrator groups can persist at least in part because they usually are shielded from the critical scrutiny of a wider audience. A profound obsession with secrecy, frequently engendered by years spent in political or military opposition, is common in perpetrator organizations and tends to exacerbate misperceptions.

A strategic approach to mass killing, therefore, suggests only that perpetrators are likely to employ mass killing when they perceive it to

be both necessary and effective, not when it is actually so. In many cases, the threat posed by the victims of mass killing is more imagined than real. The Jews of Europe, after all, posed no conceivable threat to Germany in the 1930s. This reality mattered little, however, since Germany's leaders were steadfastly convinced of the contrary, and they possessed the power to act on their convictions. Perpetrators also frequently have overestimated the capacity of mass killing to achieve their goals, especially in the long term. While mass killing can be a powerful political or military strategy, it also can be decidedly counterproductive, even from the point of view of those who instigate it. In practice, the use of massive violence has often backfired, diverting scarce resources away from real threats, provoking increased resistance from victim groups, mobilizing third parties on behalf of the victims, or discrediting the ideologies in the service of which it has been employed.

Mass killing failed to achieve its perpetrators' objectives, at least in the long run, in all of the cases examined in this book. In the Soviet Union, China, and Cambodia communist leaders resorted to mass killing in an effort to force peasants to accept new, supposedly more productive means of agriculture. While the violence succeeded in coercing the peasantry, it also resulted in massive starvation, the near collapse of the economy, and eventually contributed to the decision to abandon radical communist agricultural methods. In Turkey, Nazi Germany, and Rwanda perpetrators used mass killing to eliminate perceived threats from ethnic minorities. In each case, the task of murdering defenseless civilians drew resources away from ongoing wars, contributing to major military defeats. During the civil war in Guatemala and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, mass killing was intended to destroy civilian support for insurgent movements. In Afghanistan, the violence simply drove millions to support the rebels and provoked increased international opposition to the Soviet occupation. In Guatemala, the tactic was more successful in the short run, but popular resentment of the mili-

tary government remained high and the regime ultimately was forced to negotiate with the rebels and implement democratic reforms.

## A Typology of Mass Killing

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\* \* \* I have identified six specific motives—corresponding to six “types” of mass killing—that, under certain specific conditions, appear to generate strong incentives for leaders to initiate mass killing.

These six motives can be grouped into two general categories. First, when leaders' plans result in the near-complete material disenfranchisement of large groups of people, leaders are likely to conclude that mass killing is necessary to overcome resistance by these groups or, more radically, that mass killing is the only practical way to physically remove these groups or their influence from society. I refer to this general class as “dispossession” mass killings. Second, mass killing can become an attractive solution in military conflicts in which leaders perceive conventional military tactics to be hopeless or unacceptably costly. When leaders' efforts to defeat their enemies' military forces directly are frustrated, they face powerful incentives to target the civilian populations they suspect of supporting those forces. I refer to this class of mass killing as “coercive” mass killings.

The specific real-world scenarios in which each type of mass killing occurs, as well as several selected historical examples of each scenario, are presented in table 1. I will briefly describe each of the types of mass killing in this table in subsequent sections of this chapter.

Of the six types mass killing, three have accounted for the majority of episodes of mass killing as well as the greatest number of victims in the twentieth century: communist mass killings, ethnic mass killings, and counterinsurgent mass killings. \* \* \*

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Table 1. A Typology of Mass Killing

Motive/Type	Scenario	Examples*
DESPOSSESSIVE MASS KILLING		
Communist	Agricultural collectivization and political terror	Soviet Union (1917-53) China (1950-76) Cambodia (1975-79)
Ethnic	Ethnic cleansing	Turkish Armenia (1915-18) The Holocaust (1939-45) Rwanda (1994)
Territorial	Colonial enlargement	European colonies in North and South America
	Expansionist wars	Genocide of the Herero in German South-West Africa (1904-7) German annexation of western Poland (1939-45)
COERCIVE MASS KILLING		
Counter guerrilla	Guerrilla wars	Algerian war of independence from France (1954-62) Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1979-88) Ethiopian civil war (1970s and 1980s)
Terrorist	Terror bombing	Guatemalan civil war (1980s) Allied bombings of Germany and Japan (1940-45)
	Starvation blockades/siege warfare	Allied naval blockade of Germany (1914-19) Nigerian land blockade of Biafra (1967-70)
	Sub-state/insurgent terrorism	FLN terrorism in Algerian war of independence against France (1954-62) Viet Cong terrorism in South Vietnam (1957-75) RENAMO terrorism in Mozambique (1976-92)
Imperialist	Imperial conquests and rebellions	German occupation of Western Europe (1940-45) Japan's empire in East Asia (1910-45)

Note: This typology does not exhaust the entire universe of motives for mass killing in the twentieth century, but it does appear to account for the great majority of these episodes. At least two notable cases—the mass killing of between 250,000 and 1,000,000 people in Indonesia in 1965 and the mass killing of between 100,000 and 500,000 people in Uganda under Idi Amin from 1971 to 1979—do not appear entirely consistent with any of the motives described in this book.

\*Selected examples only, not a complete list of all instances of mass killings within each category. Some examples combine aspects of more than one motive.

Table 2. Communist Mass Killings in the Twentieth Century

Location-Dates	Description	Additional Motives	Deaths
Soviet Union (1917-23)	Russian Civil War and Red Terror	Counter guerrilla	250,000- 2,500,000
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (1927-45)	Collectivization, Great Terror, occupation/communization of Baltic states and western Poland	Counter guerrilla	10,000,000- 20,000,000
China (including Tibet) (1949-72)	Land reform, Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution, and other political purges	Counter guerrilla	10,000,000- 46,000,000
Cambodia (1975-79)	Collectivization and political repression	Ethnic	1,000,000- 2,000,000
POSSIBLE CASES*			
Bulgaria (1944-?)	Agricultural collectivization and political repression		50,000- 100,000
East Germany (1945-?)	Political repression by Soviet Union		80,000- 100,000
Romania (1945-?)	Agricultural collectivization and political repression		60,000- 300,000
North Korea (1945-?)	Agricultural collectivization and political repression	Counter guerrilla	400,000- 1,500,000
North and South Vietnam (1953-?)	Agricultural collectivization and political repression		80,000- 200,000

Note: All figures in this and subsequent tables are author's estimates based on numerous sources.

\*Episodes are listed under the heading "possible cases" in this and subsequent tables when the available evidence suggests a mass killing may have occurred, but documentation is insufficient to make a definitive judgment regarding the number of people killed, the intentionality of the killing, or the motives of the perpetrators.

are often conflated in popular parlance, but they are not synonymous. Ethnic cleansing refers to the removal of certain groups from a given territory, a process that may or may not involve mass killing. Nevertheless, like communist policies such as collectivization, large-scale ethnic cleansing frequently has been associated with mass killing because it often results in the near-complete material dispossession of large groups of people. Violence is often required to force people to relinquish their homes and their possessions. Even

after victims have been coerced into flight, the process and aftermath of large population movements itself can be deadly.

The bloodiest episodes of ethnic mass killing, however, occur when leaders conclude that they have no practical options for the physical relocation of victim groups. In such cases, perpetrators may see violent repression on a massive scale as the only way to meet the perceived threat posed by their victims. The killing may be designed to deprive the victim group of its ability to organize

Table 3. *Ethnic Mass Killings in the Twentieth Century*

<i>Location-Dates</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Additional Motives</i>	<i>Deaths</i>
Turkey (1915-18)	Genocide of Armenians	Counter guerrilla	500,000- 1,500,000
Soviet Union (1941-53)	Deportation of nationalities	Counter guerrilla	300,000- 600,000
Germany (1939-45)	Genocide of Jews and other Nazi race enemies		5,400,000- 6,800,000
Yugoslavia (1941-45)	Ustasha violence against Serbs	Counter guerrilla	350,000- 530,000
Eastern Europe (1945-47)	Post-WW II expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and elsewhere		2,000,000- 2,300,000
India (1947-48)	Partition of India		500,000- 1,000,000
Bangladesh (1971)	Partition of East Pakistan		500,000- 3,000,000
Burundi (1972)	Genocide of Hutu	Counter guerrilla	100,000- 200,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1990-95)	Ethnic cleansing of Muslims from Bosnia	Counter guerrilla	25,000- 155,000
Rwanda (1994)	Genocide of Tutsi	Counter guerrilla	500,000- 800,000

politically or militarily by eliminating its elites, intellectuals, or males of military age. At the most extreme, perpetrators may conclude that systematic extermination is the only available means to counter the threat. Ethnic mass killing, therefore, is best seen as an instrumental strategy that seeks the physical removal or permanent military or political subjugation of ethnic groups, not the annihilation of these groups as an end in itself.

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#### Territorial Mass Killing

The third general motive for dispossessive mass killing arises when powerful groups attempt to resettle territories already inhabited by large, pre-existing populations. Unlike the ethnic mass killings

described above, perpetrators of territorial mass killing do not seek to cleanse a given territory of its inhabitants because they believe these people themselves pose a threat, but rather because perpetrators want to populate (and usually cultivate) the land with their own people. As with ethnic mass killings, however, territorial mass killing occurs because the process and aftermath of rapidly removing large numbers of people from their homes often involves considerable violence.

Territorial mass killings have emerged in two closely related scenarios. First, mass killing can result when settler colonies attempt to expand their territory into regions already populated by indigenous people.<sup>14</sup> This scenario has occurred primarily in colonial settings. \* \* \*

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Table 6. Terrorist Mass Killings in the Twentieth Century

Location-Dates	Description	Additional Motives	Deaths
Germany (1914-18)	Allied blockade of Germany in WWI		250,000-425,000
China (1927-49)	Communist terror in Chinese civil war	Communist	1,800,000-3,500,000
Spain (1936-39)	Republican terrorism in Spanish civil war	Communist	20,000-55,000
United Kingdom (1940-45)	German bombardment of UK in WW II		60,000-62,000
Germany (1940-45)	Allied bombardment of Germany in WW II		300,000-600,000
Japan (1942-45)	American bombardment of Japan in WWII		268,000-900,000
Algeria (1954-63)	FLN terrorism		70,000-235,000
Vietnam (1954-75)	NLF (Viet-Cong) terrorism in Vietnam war	Communist	45,000-80,000
Nigeria (1967-70)	Suppression of secession of Biafra	Counter guerrilla?	450,000-2,000,000
Angola (1975-2002)	UNITA terrorism		125,000-560,000
Mozambique (1975-1992)	RENAMO terrorism in Mozambican civil war		100,000-700,000
Algeria (1992-2002)	Civil war/antigovernment terrorism		75,000-150,000
POSSIBLE CASES			
North Korea (1950-54)	U.S./R.O.K. bombing and other killing in Korean War	Counter guerrilla	500,000-1,500,000
Colombia (1948-58)	Liberal violence against conservatives in Colombian civil war		50,000-150,000
Iraq (1990-97)	Economic embargo of Iraq by UN/U.S. (prior to "oil for food" program)		80,000-170,000

to all others considering resistance the terrible fate awaiting those who refuse to accept imperial rule.

The Mongol empire ruled by Genghis Khan and his progeny was one of the earliest and most efficient practitioners of this strategy of mass killing. According to Paul Ratchnevsky, "Genghis Khan used terror as a strategic weapon in his military plans. . . . Terrible destruction was

threatened in the event of resistance; bloody examples were designed to spread fear and reduce the populace's will to resist."<sup>59</sup> Because imperial powers intend mass killing to deter future resistance throughout the empire, they frequently employ it even after rebellious states or regions have capitulated. To ensure the greatest effect, the violence often is carried out in an exceptionally grisly and highly public manner. One of the

bloodiest examples of this strategy in recent history occurred during the Japanese campaign to expand its empire into the Chinese mainland. In December 1937, Japanese troops descended on the city of Nanking in an orgy of rape, murder, and mutilation that ultimately left between 200,000 and 350,000 people dead.<sup>31</sup> Many explanations of the brutality of the Japanese empire in China have emphasized the racism, indiscipline, and vengefulness of Japanese troops.<sup>32</sup> However, the violence also represented a calculated strategy designed to terrify China's vast population into submission without a fight.<sup>33</sup> Indeed, it is likely that Nanking was singled out for especially harsh treatment because of the fierce resistance Japanese forces had encountered as they advanced on the city, and because of Nanking's symbolic value as the capital city of Nationalist China.

Of course, not all empires engage in mass killing, and even empires that have perfected this brutal strategy seldom unleash it against all of their conquests. The incentives for imperialist mass killing seem to be greatest when empires are relatively weak or overstretched, or when they make extreme demands on their subjects. Under these conditions, resistance to imperial rule is likely to be especially determined, and the empire's ability to police far-flung territories with conventional means will be heavily strained.

### Conclusion: Anticipating and Preventing Mass Killing

The evidence presented in this book points to three central conclusions about the causes of mass killing. First, small groups often play an important role in instigating and carrying out this kind of violence. Mass killing is usually conceived of and organized by a relatively small number of powerful political or military leaders acting in the service of their own interests, ideas, hatreds, fears, and misperceptions—not reacting to the attitudes or desires of the societies over which they preside. Indeed, in the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, China, and Cambodia—the four bloodiest mass killings I investigated—there are strong reasons to believe that, but for the influence of a single dictatorial leader, the violence might have been averted or at least substantially diminished. Perpetrators do not need widespread social support to carry out mass killing. Compliance with authority or simply passivity and indifference to the suffering of victims, what I have called negative support, is more important than active support or participation in the killing itself. In each of the eight cases I examined, relatively small military or paramilitary groups, acting under direct orders from political and military authorities, carried out the majority of the

Table 7. Imperialist Mass Killings in the Twentieth Century

Location-Dates	Description	Additional Motives	Deaths
East Asia 1937–45	Japanese occupation of East Asia (especially China)	Counter guerrilla	3,000,000–10,600,000
Western Europe 1940–45	German occupation of Western Europe	Counter guerrilla	425,000–625,000

actual killing. Civilians did play a significant role in the violence in Rwanda and the Chinese Cultural Revolution, but even in these cases the killers represented only a small fraction of society, and military or paramilitary forces killed many or most of the victims.

Second, because small groups can play such a central role in causing mass killing, I find that characteristics of society at large, such as preexisting cleavages, hatred and discrimination between groups, and nondemocratic forms of government, are of limited utility in distinguishing societies at high risk for mass killing. There is substantial evidence of preexisting hatreds or discrimination directed against at least some victim groups in each of the cases examined in this book—especially the genocides in Turkey, Nazi Germany, and Rwanda. There is little indication, however, that these attitudes were more severe than they were in many other countries that never experienced mass killing. In Guatemala and Afghanistan, perpetrators made efforts, albeit halfhearted ones, to minimize the extent of social differences and ameliorate discrimination against victims in an effort to draw support away from insurgent movements. In the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany, China, Cambodia, and Rwanda, on the other hand, leaders deliberately promoted hatred and discrimination through propaganda and indoctrination in the effort to increase public support for attacks on victim groups. Preexisting animosity between groups is a particularly weak explanation for the communist mass killings \* \* \* since many victims of these regimes were never objects of intense hatred by society at large. In fact, in all three countries, the perpetrators directed much of the killing against the communist party itself.

Third, mass killing usually is driven by instrumental, strategic calculations. Perpetrators see mass killing as a means to an end, not an end in itself. None of the cases of mass killing considered here can be accurately described as killing for killing's sake. Indeed, mass killing was never the only strategy that leaders considered to achieve their ends. Mass killing has not always

been a policy of last resort, but rarely has it been a policy of first resort either. With the possible exception of Cambodia, leaders in all eight cases examined in this book appear to have seriously considered or actively experimented with options short of mass killing to achieve their ends. Leaders adopted mass killing in frustration, only after they came to believe, although often mistakenly, that other strategies for achieving their goals were impossible or impractical.

The history of all eight cases suggests that leaders conceived of mass killing as a instrumental strategy designed to achieve their most important political or ideological goals, counter their most dangerous threats, or solve their most difficult military problems. Leaders saw mass killing as a bloody but effective solution to such problems. I have also tried to demonstrate, however, that leaders are likely to perceive mass killing as an attractive strategy only in a few, relatively uncommon situations. Three specific historical scenarios—the implementation of radical communist policies, large-scale ethnic cleansing, and counterinsurgency wars—have generated the incentives for the majority of episodes of mass killings in this century. Even in these situations, however, mass killing is not inevitable. A variety of factors and conditions, including the size of the targeted civilian population, the pace with which dispossession changes are implemented, and the ability of victim groups to flee to safer areas can impact the incentives and ability of perpetrators to carry out mass killing.

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#### NOTES

1. Shepard Krech, "Genocide in Tribal Society," *Nature*, September 1994, pp. 14-15.
2. Estimate based on numerous sources. See tables 2-7 in chapter 3. The term "mass killing" is defined below. Using a more expansive definition, Rudolph Rummel estimates that between 76 million and 360 million people

were killed in "democides" from 1900 to 1987—with a "prudent or conservative midrange estimate" of 169,198,000 deaths. Rummel's estimates tend to be considerably higher than those of most other scholars. See Rudolph Rummel, *Statistics of Democide: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900* (Charlottesville, Va.: Center for National Security Law, 1997), p. 355; and Rudolph Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994), pp. xviii–xx. Zbigniew Brzezinski estimates more than 80 million politically motivated deaths from 1900 to 1993, not including civilian or military deaths during war. See Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Out of Control: Global Turmoil on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), p. 17. Matthew White estimates 83 million deaths from "genocide and tyranny" and an additional 44 million in "man-made famines" during the twentieth century. See Matthew White, "Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century" <http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat8.htm> [June 2003]. Using a more restricted definition, Barbara Harff estimates that between 8.9 and 19.8 million people were killed in forty-eight episodes of genocide and "politicide" between 1945 and 1994. See Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr, "Victims of the State: Genocides, Politicides and Group Repression from 1945 to 1995," in Albert Jongman, ed., *Contemporary Genocide: Causes, Cases, Consequences* (Leiden: Den Haag, 1996), pp. 49–51.

3. Rummel, *Death by Government*, p. 15. Rummel's estimate is for the period between 1900 and 1987. William Eckhardt estimates 85,527,000 war-related deaths between 1900 and 1988, of which approximately 50 percent were civilians. Estimates of civilian war-related deaths by Eckhardt appear to include many episodes of intentional killing and therefore overlap considerably with genocide and mass killing. See William Eckhardt, "Civilian Deaths in Wartime," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20, no. 1 (1989): 90.

4. Raphael Lemkin, *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, Proposals for Redress* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), p. 79.
5. For the complete text of the genocide convention, see Lawrence J. LeBlanc, *The United States and the Genocide Convention* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1991), pp. 245–249. For a description of Lemkin's efforts to draft and ratify the convention, see Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell": *America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), pp. 17–85.
6. *Oxford English Dictionary*, 2d ed., 6:445.
7. For one example, see Robert Johnson and Paul S. Leighton, "American Genocide: The Destruction of the Black Underclass," in Craig Summers and Eric Markusen, eds., *Collective Violence: Harmful Behavior in Groups and Governments* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), pp. 95–140. The use of the term "holocaust" has generated a similar political debate. See Samuel G. Freedman, "Laying Claim to Sorrow beyond Words," *New York Times*, December 13, 1997, p. A19.
8. For reviews of the debate on the definition of genocide, see Scott Straus, "Contested Meanings and Conflicting Imperatives: A Conceptual Analysis of Genocide," *Journal of Genocide Research* 3, no. 3 (November 2001): 349–375; Helen Fein, *Genocide: A Sociological Perspective* (London: Sage, 1993), pp. xi–xix, 1–31; Eric Markusen and David Kopf, *The Holocaust and Strategic Bombing: Genocide and Total War in the Twentieth Century* (Boulder: Westview, 1995), pp. 39–64; and Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, *The History and Sociology of Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), pp. 12–23.
9. This definition is similar in some respects to Rummel's concept of "democide." Rummel's definition, however, includes the killing of any number of civilians, no matter how small. In addition, Rummel specifies that democide must be carried out by government

groups, while the perpetrators of mass killing can belong to any kind of group. See Rudolph Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1994), pp. 31–43.

10. Disease can also be spread intentionally as part of an effort to exterminate large numbers of people. European colonists, for example, appear to have made deliberate efforts to spread fatal diseases among native American populations, although it remains unclear whether these early experiments with biological warfare proved “successful.” See William H. McNeill, *Plagues and Peoples* (Garden City: Doubleday, 1976), p. 222; and Russell Thornton, *American Indian Holocaust and Survival: A Population History since 1492* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), pp. 78–79.
11. Steven Katz, for example, argues that “the concept of genocide applies *only* when there is an actualized intent, however successfully carried out, to physically destroy an *entire* group.” Steven Katz, *The Holocaust in Historical Context: The Holocaust and Mass Death before the Modern Age* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 128; italics in original.
12. If an episode of mass killing continues for more than five years, all deaths resulting from it are included as long as at least 50,000 civilians were killed in any five-year period during the episode. For example, approximately 80,000 civilians were intentionally killed during the civil war in El Salvador from 1979 to 1992. Although this figure represents an average of less than 50,000 deaths every five years, more than 50,000 of these occurred in the five-year period from 1980 to 1985. All intentional civilian deaths resulting from the civil war are therefore included as mass killing.
13. This definition is generally consistent with the definition of “civilian” adopted by the two 1977 additional protocols of the Geneva Convention. See Michael Bothe, Karl Josef Partsch, and Waldemar A. Solf, *New Rules for Victims of Armed Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1982), pp. 274–318. For more on the history and evolution of the international legal protection of civilian populations during war, see Yvonne van Dongen, *The Protection of Civilian Populations in Time of Armed Conflict* (Amsterdam: Thesis Publishers, 1991).
14. Settler colonies should be distinguished from imperial possessions. Settler colonies are territories intended to be permanently inhabited by large numbers of people from the colonizing state. Imperial possessions are not densely settled. Rather, subjects of empire are required to provide goods and services for the empire. Empires have also been frequent perpetrators of mass killing, although for very different reasons that will be described below.
15. On the distinction between coercion and the “brute force” use of violence, see Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 2–18.
16. Mao Tse-Tung, *On Guerrilla Warfare*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961), pp. 44, 92–93.
17. See Robert A. Pape, *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 269.
18. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 261.
19. Quoted in Ronald Schaffer, *Wings of Judgment: American Bombing in World War II* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 36.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 270.
21. See David Irving, *The Destruction of Dresden* (New York: Ballantine, 1965), p. 76, Anthony Verrier, *The Bomber Offensive* (London: B. T. Batsford, 1968), p. 301; and Michael Sherry, *The Rise of American Air Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 154.
22. Quoted in Sherry, *Rise of American Air Power*, p. 154.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

24. For more on the political and military use of famine, see Kurt Jonassohn, "Famine, Genocide and Refugees," *Society* 30, no. 6 (September/October 1993) pp. 73-74; John Mueller and Karl Mueller, "The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 23, no. 1 (March 2000): 163-187; David Keen, *The Benefits of Famine: A Political Economy of Famine and Relief in Southwestern Sudan, 1983-1989* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994); Jean Mayer, "Time to Ban the Use of Starvation as a Weapon of War," *Christian Science Monitor*, December 24, 1984, p. 12; and Karl Zinsmeister, "All the Hungry People," *Reason* 20, no. 2 (June 1988): 22-30.
25. Martin Gilbert, *The First World War* (New York: Henry Holt, 1994), p. 391. William Eckhardt estimates that eight hundred thousand civilians died as a result of blockade from 1914 to 1918. See "Civilian Deaths in Wartime," *Bulletin of Peace Proposals* 20 no. 1 (1989): 95.
26. John de St. Jorre, *The Brothers' War: Biafra and Nigeria* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972), p. 412; and Dan Jacobs, *The Brutality of Nations* (New York: Paragon House, 1988).
27. Alistair Horne, *A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962* (New York: Viking, 1977), p. 538. On the strategic use of terror by Islamist guerrillas in Algeria in the 1990s, see Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Wanton and Senseless? The Logic of Massacres in Algeria," *Rationality and Society* II, no. 3 (1999): 243-285.
28. See Guenter Lewy, *America in Vietnam* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 272-279; and Douglas Pike, *The Viet-Cong Strategy of Terror* (Saigon: United States Mission to Viet-Nam, 1970).
29. For a similar argument, see Kurt Jonassohn and Frank Chalk, "A Typology of Genocide and Some Implications for the Human Rights Agenda," in Isidor Wallimann and Michael Dobkowski, eds., *Genocide and the Modern Age* (New York: Greenwood, 1987), pp. 13-14.
30. Paul Ratchnevsky, *Genghis Khan: His Life and Legacy* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), pp. 160, 173.
31. Iris Chang, *The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997).
32. John Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).
33. Callum MacDonald, "Kill All, Burn All, Loot All: The Nanking Massacres of December 1937 and Japanese Policy in China," in Mark Levene and Penny Roberts eds., *The Massacre in History* (New York: Berghahn Books, 1999), pp. 223-245.

## BARRY R. POSEN

### THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND ETHNIC CONFLICT

The end of the Cold War has been accompanied by the emergence of nationalist, ethnic and religious conflict in Eurasia. However,

the risks and intensity of these conflicts have varied from region to region: Ukrainians and Russians are still getting along relatively well; Serbs and Slovenians had a short, sharp clash; Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims have waged open warfare; and Armenians and Azeris seem destined